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On 26 April 1986, Block 4 of 
the nuclear power station in 
Chernobyl exploded, its 200-
ton graphite core ignited and, 
burning for 10 days, it spread 
radioactivity far beyond the bor-
ders of the USSR. 
Reliable information on what 
had happened travelled much 
more slowly. At first only terse 
statements describing and ad-
mitting little were issued. 
Then, several months later, a 
sudden burst of information and 
requests for cooperation raised 
expectations of a thorough 
investigation and follow up. 
These hopes were soon dash-
ed as the walls of secrecy again 
closed in. 
Residents were told that 
everything was in order - even 
as they watched hundreds of 
thousands of "liquidators" at 
work, were evacuated in large 
numbers, and were warned 
against eating their own produce. 
When the USSR collapsed, 
a pattern of earlier events 
emerged. While not so different 
from what happened elsewhere 
in the early years of the Cold 
War, they were so serious in 
their extent and consequences 
that their lessons need to be 
learned even now. 
THE RIVER TECHA 
Starting behind in the deadly 
arms race, the USSR tried 
desperately to close the nu-
clear weapons gap. A key to 
this effort was Mayak, a secret 
centre close to the city of 
Cheliabinsk near the southern 
Ural Mountains that employed 
several thousand workers in its 
reactor and plutonium separa-
tion plant. Acute radiation 
sickness was frequent and, 
though a well-kept secret until 
recently, it is now known that, 
at least in the workers of the 
separation plant, cancers were 
substantially increased. 
The workers were not the 
only ones to pay the price for 
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the weapons development. 
At the start, all unwanted fis-
sion products were simply re-
leased into a small river, the 
Techa. Between 1950 and 
1956, some several million cu-
ries of radionuclides were dump-
ed there, much of which settled 
into the river sediments. In 
1951, the Techa flooded its 
banks, contaminating the soil 
with radioisotopes that were 
taken up by the farm produce. 
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Levels of gamma radiation in 
some river villages soon 
exceeded the natural rate by a 
factor up to 1 million. Unaware 
of the danger, the inhabitants 
continued to use the water for 
washing, irrigation, drinking and 
cooking. They were exposed 
both from the outside by gam-
ma-emitting fission products, 
such as caesium, and from the 
inside by radionuclides, espe-
cially strontium, from the river 
water. Disguised as geodetic 
mapping teams, specialists from 
Moscow came for measure-
ments. When they found 
alarmingly high radiation levels, 
they ordered the people in 
some villages, without ex-
planation, to stop using the river 
. water and to drill wells. But the 
river water tasted better, and the 
villagers largely continued to 
use it In 1956, the most heavily 
contaminated villages were 
evacuated and destroyed. 
Thousands of people were 
relocated without explanation. 
In 1957, many of these evac-
uees were forced to move a-
gain because of a nuclear acci-
dent at Kyshtym. 
At Kyshtym, a large tank 
with organic solutions and fis-
sion products exploded when 
its cooling system failed. A 
cloud of fission products laden 
with radiostrontium contamin-
ated thousands of square miles. 
This time the evacuation was 
prompt, and the totai radiation 
exposure far less than that at 
the Techa river. In 1956, re­
leases into the Techa were stop­
ped and the fission products 
were dumped mto manmade 
ponds. These ponds are now 
the largest open dumps of 
radioactivity in the world, and 
there are no known strategies 
to remove or even secure them. 
OVERCOMING 
THE OBSTACLES 
Despite the obstacles to in­
vestigating Chernobyl, the All-
Union Institute for Radiation 
Medicine in Kiev performed valu­
able work on dosimetry. But 
before epidemiological studies 
could begin, responsibility was 
transferred to a site near 
Moscow. Little progress has 
since been seen. Even with, 
the well-defined problem of 
childhood thyroid cancer in 
Belarus, it has not been pos­
sible to establish even a simple 
list of the birthdates of the pa­
tients. The opportunity has 
been lost of establishing a 
clear cohort effect that could 
prove beyond doubt the causal 
relation to the reactor accident. 
And this loss is clearly a loss 
for those so severely affected 
by the accident. 
At the Techa river, despite 
the secrecy, Dr Mira Kossenka 
and her colleagues at the Ural 
Research Centre for Radiation 
Medicine began a follow up in 
1965 of some 30,000 exposed 
persons and two larger control 
groups. They reconstructed the 
dosimetry of external and inter­
nal exposures using classified 
technical reports of the first 
teams to go in. Though this in­
formation is complicated and 
incomplete, it seems suitable 
for estimating the average 
doses from external gamma 
ray exposures in the various 
villages. Determining internal 
doses, especially for strontium, 
is more complicated but is 
especially reliable because it 
is based on actual measure­
ments performed on individuals. 
Since 1970, a sophisticated 
whole-body counter began 
measuring the strontium body 
burdens in residents of the 
Techa region, providing tens of 
thousands of measurements. 
With a biological half life of 
strontium in bone of about 15 
years, even today's measure­
ments are informative. 
But what about the years dur­
ing which strontium was incor­
porated into the bones? To 
answer this question, the 
scientists in Cheliabinsk devel­
oped radiation detectors that 
measure beta rays emitted 
from teeth. By correlating the 
measured values with the ages 
of the residents, they were able 
to reconstruct, with considera­
ble accuracy, the accumulation 
of incorporated strontium dur­
ing the critical years from 1950 
to 1955. They found that incor­
porated strontium accounted 
for the major part of the radia­
tion exposure. In some vil­
lages, the average dose ex­
ceeded t gray, with many per­
sons exposed to several grays. 
These exposures are far higher 
than the lifetime limit of 0.35 
gray that was the criterion for 
evacuation after the Chernobyl 
accident. 
They also found an increase 
in leukemia. About half of the 
nearly 40 cases are believed 
due to the radiation exposure. 
One important, if tentative, 
conclusion is that the risk esti­
mates are 2-3 times lower than 
the leukemia risk estimates 
from the study of the atomic 
bomb survivors. This agrees 
with radiobiological expec­
tations of a somewhat reduced 
risk of radiation-induced cancer 
when a given dose is not given 
all at once, but is stretched 
over months or years. 
The picture regarding other 
tumours is less clearcut be­
cause their relative excess risks 
after a radiation exposure are 
smaller than those for leuke-
mias. A careful distinction 
between the incidences in 
Russian populations and in 
other ethnic groups also must 
also be made. Taking all this 
into consideration, radiation-
induced increases of solid tu­
mours have also been found. 
THE FUTURE 
Difficult tasks remain. Some 
appear to be hopelessly com­
plicated and forbiddingly 
expensive, such as the clean 
up of the vast storage ponds of 
radioactivity. 
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Other important tasks are 
much more feasible, such as the 
continued follow up of health 
effects, Stift others should be 
feasible and are not less ur­
gent, but are still far from resolu­
tion. What and how should 
those affected be told, and by 
whom? These people have 
been exposed for years not only 
to increased levels of radiation 
but also to falsifications and 
lies. By now they are reluctant, 
or even entirely unwilling, to 
accept and trust official infor­
mation. This deadlock needs to 
be broken and a normal way of 
living returned to the region. 
And what applies to the Techa 
river region applies equally to 
other areas burdened by the 
past Η abilities of the nuclear 
weapons race. 
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